

## **Marx's Lumpenproletariat and Murray's Underclass: Concepts Best Abandoned?**

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*The Eighteenth Brumaire, /i> features Marx's most extended discussion of the lumpenproletariat. In this chapter I shall give a brief account of his analysis of the lumpenproletariat and their political role. I shall then challenge the coherence of this account and argue that Marx uses the concept as a way of vilifying the part of the proletariat which supported Louis Napoleon Bonaparte on the one hand and vilifying and trivialising Bonaparte himself on the other. Finally I shall point out that there is a considerable similarity in both definition and function between Marx's view of the lumpenproletariat and Charles Murray's contemporary theory of the underclass.*

*The account of the lumpenproletariat which follows is not original, but is needed to make subsequent discussion clear.<sup>[1]</sup> Although possibly presaged in Engels's account of the Irish immigrants in *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, the lumpenproletariat make their initial appearance in the *Communist Manifesto*:*

*The 'dangerous class', the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.<sup>[2]</sup>*

*Mobile Guards, each a thousand strong, composed of young men from fifteen to twenty years old. They belonged for the most part to the lumpenproletariat, which in all big towns forms a mass sharply differentiated from the industrial proletariat, a recruiting ground for thieves and criminals of all kinds living on the crumbs of society, people without a definite trade, vagabonds, gens sans feu et sans aveu [men without hearth or home], varying according to the degree of civilisation of the nation to which they belong, but never renouncing their lazzaroni character--at the youthful age at which the Provisional Government recruited them, thoroughly malleable, as capable of the most heroic deeds and the most exalted sacrifices as of the basest banditry and the foulest corruption.<sup>[3]</sup>*

*From the aristocracy there were bankrupted roués of doubtful means and dubious provenance, from the bourgeoisie there were degenerate wastrels on the take, vagabonds, demobbed soldiers, discharged convicts, runaway galley slaves, swindlers and cheats, thugs, pickpockets, conjurers, card-sharps, pimps, brothel-keepers, porters, day-labourers, organ grinders, scrap dealers, knife grinders, tinkers and beggars, in short the whole amorphous, jumbled mass of flotsam and jetsam that the French term bohemian...<sup>[4]</sup>*

*To summarise what emerges from these lively definitions, the lumpenproletariat is:*

*i. apparently, a tightened-up version of the common ideas of the time about the 'dangerous classes', although the proletariat itself tended to be identified in the terms reserved by Marx and Engels for the lumpenproletariat before socialists including Marx and Engels managed to revise common meanings;<sup>[5]</sup> ii. people drawn from both pre-capitalist and capitalist social formations but who had left or been evicted from their previous social class; iii. people who do not accept the idea of making their living by regular work; iv. a source of criminals; v. importantly, for Marx, comprised of people who are liable to be tempted by illicit pickings into the service of the right, particularly of the finance aristocracy, who share the approach to life and morality of the lumpenproletariat.*

*Anyone not totally degenerate would hate to be identified as a lumpenproletarian, which leads on to the use Marx makes of the concept. One way the concept functions is to dissociate the proletariat from supporting the bourgeoisie or Bonaparte: the Mobile Guards are lumpenproletarians, not proletarians;<sup>[6]</sup> proletarian support for the regime is actually lumpen elements; the members of the Society of 10 December are lumpenproletarians.<sup>[7]</sup> The other is to use the disreputable lumpenproletariat to impugn first the finance aristocracy:*

*The finance aristocracy, in its mode of acquisition as well as in its pleasures, is nothing but the rebirth of the lumpenproletariat on the heights of bourgeois society...in 1847, on the most prominent stages of bourgeois society, the same scenes were publicly enacted that regularly lead the lumpenproletariat to brothels, to workhouses and lunatic asylums, to the bar of justice, to the dungeon, and to the scaffold.<sup>[8]</sup>*

*And also Bonaparte: the central puzzle of the Eighteenth Brumaire is how a swindling nonentity managed to become President of France and to get rid the National Assembly. Bonaparte's association with the Society of 10 December enables Marx to stress the shallowness of Bonaparte and the relative insubstantiality of his regime.<sup>[9]</sup> Take away his lumpen characteristics and other explanations have to be found, such as the ones put forward by Geoff Watkins and Roger Price elsewhere in this volume, respectively that the Bonaparte legend was very powerful in French politics, and that Bonaparte's regime offered an effective path to modernisation. Elsewhere Marx's conspiratorial rivals for leadership of the working class are tarred with the lumpenproletarian brush.<sup>[10]</sup> In a well-researched and comprehensive article Bovenkerk argues that a major function of the lumpenproletariat in Marx and Engels is to explain away parts of the proletariat which failed to behave in a proper revolutionary fashion.<sup>[11]</sup>*

*Let us move on to look at the problems with Marx's definitions above. To start with, we are left unclear who the lumpenproletariat really are. 'That passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society' sounds as though we might be dealing with, for example, peasants displaced from the land by enclosure or by the problems Marx charts in the Eighteenth Brumaire.<sup>[12]</sup> Historically these gravitated towards the cities and formed, often reluctantly, the beginnings of the industrial proletariat. So the difference*

*between a recent ex-peasant who is becoming a proletarian rather than a lumpenproletarian seems to be a matter of attitude rather than of relation to the means of production: the proletarian has become more resigned to selling his labour power. Displaced peasants could also feature as 'people without a definite trade, vagabonds, gens sans feu et sans aveu', but again one would expect such people to turn into proletarians over time.*

*What about displaced proletarians--people whose industries have closed for one reason or another, people who cannot easily find work because they are old, sick, injured? These are definitely not the lumpenproletariat, we learn in *Capital*. The lumpenproletariat are 'vagabonds, criminals [and] prostitutes', the "dangerous" classes'; instead displaced proletarians are the 'lazarus-layers' of the proletariat.<sup>[13]</sup> And yet, mightn't at least some displaced proletarians turn to crime or to temporary jobs sometimes, particularly if the alternative was the workhouse? Marx is ambivalent about how easy it would be for a proletarian thrown out by one branch of industry to find employment in another. Some of his writing about the worker as a mere appendage of the machine suggests that one might turn easily from the appendage of one machine into the appendage of another; on the other hand, there are suggestions that people become so distorted by one machine that they are not suitable to work with another. Again, there may be problems about accepting factory life at all, which mean that one has to start life in a factory young, although perhaps moving to another factory might not be so difficult.<sup>[14]</sup> Perhaps this ambiguity corresponds to real life in the mid nineteenth century: one factory might involve more training or more distortion of the person or worse conditions than another; the demand for hands would be greater at one time than another. Any difficulties would surely lead some proletarians towards lumpen expedients.<sup>[15]</sup>*

*Coming to Marx's most detailed definition, 'porters, day-labourers, scrap dealers, knife grinders [and], tinkers' all make their living through labour. They are seen as lumpenproletarians because they are self-employed and because their forms of work are very easy to take up and abandon. The question of how easy it would be to take up proletarian employment is discussed in the previous paragraph. On the face of things, if it was easy to become a proletarian there is nothing to stop at least some lumpenproletarians making the transition; if it was hard to enter a new proletarian job then lumpenproletarians would be more stuck but would tend to be joined by displaced proletarians.*

*'Conjurers, card sharps and brothel keepers' and 'prostitutes' raise another question. Let us assume that cardsharps are actually professional gamblers rather than fraudsters. Conjurers provide legitimate entertainment; professional gamblers are part of a substantial industry which is basically legal in modern Britain, although forms of gambling are certainly banned by some governments; and prostitution can be seen as sex work although, again, there is much debate about whether prostitution or forms of it is exploitative of women's sexuality. However, whether we use Marx's attempts at distinguishing productive and unproductive labour or whether we rely on various arguments about the legitimacy of particular activities we are unlikely to get a list of illegitimate activities which would command widespread agreement, whether in the*

*society generally or amongst socialists. As a personal example I would put people who slaughter animals and sell meat, estate agents, people who pressurise children to buy useless toys and people who send spam emails or do telephone cold calling and roofers from Hartlepool on my list of dubious characters deserving to be part of the lumpenproletariat, but remove from it people who offer useful services such as prostitutes and drug dealers. What is going on here seems to be that Marx is including an assortment of occupations which command widespread dislike to make the lumpenproletariat seem less reputable rather than engaging in any kind of serious social (or socialist) analysis.*

*Marx's account of the finance aristocracy is also problematical. Whilst manipulating large amounts of money can certainly spill over into gambling and into illegalities such as fraud, stealing pension funds or insider trading there is a legitimate function in capitalist economies for people who move capital from less to more profitable investments, assess levels of risk in investments, offer advice to others etc. In other words, this activity is part of the general evils of capitalism rather than a specially serious excrescence, and it is hard to see how a capitalist economy could function without at least some role for a stock exchange, futures markets, currency trading etc. There may well be scope for socialists to benefit from splits amongst the bourgeoisie. For obvious reasons they would tend to side with manufacturing capital which employs people and develops the forces of production against finance capitalists simply concerned with short-term profits. This presents a particularly difficult problem for British socialists given the size and relative success of the City of London compared with British manufacturing. But short of an unlikely world-wide revolutionary expropriation of capital the way forward would seem to be to try to reduce speculation (perhaps in the British case by joining the Euro), and encourage long term socially and environmentally responsible investment rather than eliminating financial capital. In this context the simple identification of city financiers with lumpenproletarian pleasures and vices is not helpful.*

*My analysis of Marx's main definitions leads me to sympathise with Bovenkerk's conclusion, based on a wider range of references: 'In their [Marx and Engels's] more theoretical works, their definition of the term lumpenproletariat is unclear and inconsistent. Anyone who tries to base further study upon their interpretation of the term will soon be at his or her wits' end.'<sup>[16]</sup>*

*Marx has also been challenged on the grounds that the lumpenproletariat is not always associated with the right. Historically the workers most willing to engage in revolutionary activity have been those who have recently left the land and experience factory work as inhuman and unnatural. Thus revolutions have typically happened in newly industrialised countries rather than those which are more mature. A common observation in Russia was that the more established skilled workers supported the Mensheviks whilst more recent arrivals tended to support the Bolsheviks. And it would be the new arrivals whose relatives would tend to be living a hand-to-mouth urban existence as knife grinders and porters, but who would in many cases sympathise politically with revolutionary socialism. There are similar comments in Mao<sup>[17]</sup> and Fanon.<sup>[18]</sup> The most credible group of revolutionary socialists in the USA since the Second World War were*

*the Black Panthers, who also thought of much of their following as lumpenproletarian, and even boasted a supporting rock group entitled the Lumpen.<sup>[19]</sup>*

*I now turn to a modern version of the idea of the lumpenproletariat, the idea of the underclass. I want to consider this idea as found in one of its most prominent exponents, Charles Murray. What sort of people, according to Murray, are the underclass? Murray says that he first noticed the underclass in the town where he grew up 'Their homes were littered and unkempt. The men in the family were unable to hold a job for more than a few weeks at a time. Drunkenness was common. The children grew up ill schooled and ill behaved and contributed a disproportionate share of the local juvenile delinquents.'<sup>[20]</sup> Murray sees this kind of person as distinct from blue-collar workers. This description lacks the picaresque features of Marx's definitions of the lumpenproletariat, but seems to be a description of a similar social group.*

*Murray made his reputation with analyses of the United States, but was then invited to the UK by The Sunday Times. He offered two accounts of the underclass here, which were published together with British criticisms of his ideas in Charles Murray and the Underclass: the developing debate. In brief, Murray argues that areas of Britain have come to be inhabited by an underclass. There are three interlocking features of his account, illegitimacy, crime and idleness. Illegitimacy has been increasing substantially. From the time of Henry VIII to that of Elizabeth II English illegitimacy rates stayed around 4.5 per cent. They then moved up somewhat in the 50s and 60s, but went up dramatically in the late 70s and after so that by 1994 they hit 31.2 per cent. Alongside this the rate of divorce has increased to a record high, and the rate of marriage, particularly first marriage, has declined. People are setting less value on being married. Illegitimate children are concentrated in the poorest areas where there are most mothers from social class V, areas such as Middlesbrough. Obviously cohabitation has risen as an alternative to marriage, but Murray sees this as an unstable relationship, probably leading on to serial cohabitation. Murray argues that professional people are continuing to marry and that amongst professionals there will be a reversion to Victorian values and thus the 'new Victorians' will be surrounded by the New Rabble.<sup>[21]</sup> The decline in marriage has occurred because of a cultural assault from feminists and because state benefits have made it too easy to raise children outside marriage.<sup>[22]</sup> One might wonder to what extent this is a black problem: isn't there a tradition of illegitimacy amongst people who originate from the West Indies? Murray acknowledges that there is, but says there are so few blacks in Britain that this boosts the illegitimacy statistics by a mere 1 per cent.<sup>[23]</sup> Apart from the general change in British culture a major reason for the increase in illegitimacy amongst the poorest is the benefit system which makes it easier to bring up children in the absence of fathers than it was in the past.*

*Murray's image of these families is that they essentially lack fathers. They thus tend to become unruly, and well-behaved children who live in communities where there are many single-parent families have to be violent in self-defence. This is all made worse by the other two features of the underclass.*

*Murray says that the prevalence of crime in areas where there is an underclass is damaging in two ways: it makes life difficult for law-abiding people who live there, and it gives children growing up there the wrong kind of socialising norms. One tends to think of England as more law-abiding than the USA, but it has a higher rate of burglary and probably of motor theft.<sup>[24]</sup> Violent crime in England is rising very rapidly even if the homicide rate is well below that in the US, and overtook the US in 1996.<sup>[25]</sup> This is not surprising because: 'in every respect--the chances of getting caught, the chances of being found guilty and the chances of going to prison--crime has become dramatically safer in Britain throughout the post-war period, and most blatantly safer since 1960'.<sup>[26]</sup>*

*The third major feature of the underclass is the number of able-bodied young men unwilling to work. Young men see unemployment benefit as a 'right', and are not willing to work at realistic rates of pay. If offered work they tend to decline and are insufficiently self-disciplined to hold down a job. This is potentially a disaster as they are 'barbarians' who need the civilising influence of work and supporting a wife.*

*For Marx the major immediate worry concerning the lumpenproletariat was that they might be used as foot soldiers by the right, notably by the finance aristocracy. Murray describes his politics as those of a Whig,<sup>[27]</sup> and not surprisingly his worries are different. The main concerns which come out of his British writings are that the underclass costs a lot in welfare benefits and in paying for police and prisons; that the underclass culture tends to spread and is pernicious: obviously most men need to work; and that underclass habits make life very difficult for people trying to bring up children well in areas where the underclass is the main class. He adds, but does not really explain, that the underclass is a threat to the survival of 'free institutions and a civil society'.<sup>[28]</sup>*

*Why has an underclass been developing in Britain? Murray's explanations are: the increased cultural acceptability of illegitimacy; the way in which the welfare state makes it possible for single mothers to bring up children without fathers; the way that benefits make low paid work unattractive, particularly for men and the way that crime has become an easier way of life. Murray's account obviously immediately raises many theoretical and empirical questions. As a matter of theory, do Murray's three aspects really hang together?<sup>[29]</sup> Would an underclass be pretty much the same thing as a lumpenproletariat, and if we wish to retain a Marxist framework of analysis but reject the concept of the lumpenproletariat, does this also point to rejecting the idea of an underclass? As a matter of fact, have we, as he claims, been developing an underclass in Britain? Is there really such a phenomenon in the USA?*

*A British empirical reply to Murray is easy to construct, and is politically important. The most important riposte is in terms of the relationship of cause and effect. Back in the 1960s Britain had virtually full employment. I can recall from my days in the student Socialist Society at Manchester University a leading light predicting in 1968 that unemployment was likely to go over 250,000 shortly and that this would lead to a revolutionary situation...Unemployment at that level, before the numerous statistical adjustments of the 1980s designed to disguise the extent to which unemployment had grown, left little scope for an underclass. Unemployment then grew in the 1970s thanks to*

*increased international competition, the oil crisis and, arguably, the unrestrained use of trade union power. Then came the Thatcher victory in 1979, followed by a range of specific policies which led to massive rises in unemployment: the vigorous application of monetarism even at the height of the 1983 recession; specific anti-union measures in a series of five Acts of Parliament; cuts in benefits and in higher rates of tax and the promotion of an individualist ideology most notoriously encapsulated in 'there is no such thing as society'. Thatcherite policies, which have continued in a less abrasive form under Major and Blair, left Britain more exposed than, for example, France, to increasing international competition and at least some shifting of manufacturing jobs to third world countries offering cheap labour.<sup>[30]</sup>*

*Middlesbrough is specifically cited by Murray as a venue where the underclass has developed. The starting point of a local study fits the above analysis well: in the late 1960s there was a stable social structure underpinned by 'near full employment in relatively well paid, long-term and skilled jobs in Teesside's chemical, steel and heavy engineering industries'. However, 'between 1975 and 1986 one quarter of all jobs and half of all manufacturing jobs were lost on Teesside'.<sup>[31]</sup> This is at a time when living off the state was generally being made harder.<sup>[32]</sup> Indeed, by 2000 although overall unemployment on Teesside had fallen, in Middlesbrough those unemployed and claiming benefit, people on training schemes and people who would like to work but were not formally unemployed totalled some 35 per cent of the labour force.<sup>[33]</sup> In these circumstances it is plain that the major problem was unemployment facilitated by the policies of new right politicians. These same politicians found Murray's doctrines appealing in that they shift the blame for unemployment and deprivation to 'generous' welfare measures on the one hand and features of the communities suffering unemployment on the other.*

*There are a series of more general ripostes to Murray published alongside his articles and elsewhere which are worth rehearsing briefly.<sup>[34]</sup> He argues that illegitimacy is much greater in areas inhabited by the underclass than amongst the population generally and specifically amongst well paid young people who are in work, who, he says, are the 'new Victorians', whereas actually there has been a major tendency for couples to live together and have children across all social classes; and single mothers tend to remarry eventually.<sup>[35]</sup> The idea that there is a culture of deprivation which reproduces itself was a pet theme of an early adviser to Mrs Thatcher, Sir Keith Joseph (his eugenic ideas led to the nickname 'Sir Sheath'). A substantial research programme failed to produce much support for his views.<sup>[36]</sup> In fairness to Murray his American writings seem to be based more on the idea of the immediate rational choices of the poor than of a culture of poverty on the lines of Oscar Lewis.<sup>[37]</sup>*

*In the Teesside study there was strong evidence of the persistence of working class rather than underclass values amongst young people living in 'Willowdene', an estate which would certainly be a home of the underclass if one really existed on Teesside:*

*a consistent finding of the research was that, whatever the nature of individual experiences, young people shared a conventional outlook and aspiration to marry, settle*

*down and have children themselves. This aspiration was found throughout the sample, including among persistent criminals and drug users who had had the least positive experiences of family life. For virtually all young people in the sample the future is seen conventionally as 'nice husband or wife, nice house and nice car'.<sup>[38]</sup>*

*Because getting a steady job was very difficult in the area:*

*people worked outside the formal labour-market: caring for children and in the home, in more informal economic activities, on youth training schemes or New Deal programmes, or in a criminal enterprises. There was a general resistance to living a life on benefits.<sup>[39]</sup>*

*It was striking how far these values extended. Thus the sons of a heroin dealer unable to carry on because of imprisonment took over the family business; thieving is termed 'grafting', and often approached in the same way in the sense of establishing regular hours of work; one thief commented: 'I'm not a dole-waller. I never sign on. I was a thief, that's my own occupation.'<sup>[40]</sup>*

*Thus although Murray comes from a very different part of the political spectrum from Marx, and the political impact of the idea of the underclass is very different from that of the proletariat, the same comment can be made on both of them: the concept is being used for its political impact rather than because it provides good explanations. The political impact of both concepts is pernicious and both are an obstacle to clear analysis.*

*This general rebuttal of Murray (and indeed, Marx on the lumpenproletariat) is not the end of the story because it leaves too many loose ends. Going back to the empirical account of Britain there may not be an underclass as a group sharply distinguished from the working class, but there are certainly geographical areas where the problems alluded to by Murray are experienced: there is such a level of crime that it is not possible to go out to work to acquire things in the normal way, because your house will probably be burgled in your absence;<sup>[41]</sup> where the schools are so bad that the chances of leaving literate, numerate and with a decent set of GCSEs is very low; and where the local economy provides so little demand that it is difficult to operate businesses successfully. In the same way, to the extent there are people with lumpenproletarian characteristics they might well present a problem under Marx's socialism in which all work and are paid accordingly. Here the discussion has basically moved from a discussion of the underclass to that of social exclusion, a situation where the impact of a whole range of poor facilities and problems interact to make for a poor quality of life and for difficulties in any attempts to ameliorate them.<sup>[42]</sup> Without commenting on Labour's actual attempts to deal with social exclusion the idea that it is a problem and that a co-ordinated solution is needed is plainly valid. A dimension of these problems which Murray does not discuss in his British writings is the problem caused by acquisitive crime aimed at keeping up addicts' drug supplies. In the Middlesbrough study the coming of heroin in the early 1990s was widely seen as worsening the quality of life on the estate, and plainly requires specific attention be it more effective policing or legalisation.<sup>[43]</sup>*



Moreover, there is such a lot more to Murray which relates to his ideas about the underclass and which would repay attention by socialists. To start with, his specific claim about the underclass in the USA is that it developed in the late 1960s and early 70s at a time when the general economy was booming, so that the ready British answer above won't wash, although a very specific response discussing the job situation in the inner city might.<sup>[44]</sup> It is very important to get this right because Murray's claim is that enhanced welfare and less effective policing led to the growth of an underclass, and this idea has been used by the right in US politics as a justification for cuts in welfare and more imprisonment. Part of Murray's appeal is that he uses a very straightforward rational choice explanation for the choices of poor people. Thus men drifting in and out of work, women having children outside marriage on welfare and students failing at school are all explained by Murray in terms of changes in US state policy as they would impact on any ordinary person in that situation. For socialists there must be something wrong with these arguments, and it would benefit us to pinpoint what. And while there is some pleasure in reading Murray's recent arguments to the effect that the underclass has not gone away even though unemployment and crime in the USA have gone down very substantially, one feels that he may still be making some points worth discussing.<sup>[45]</sup>

Beyond this there is a range of claims about race made by Murray. In *Losing Ground* he claims that US blacks have been particular victims of foolishly generous welfare policies, compounded with the pernicious effects of affirmative action programmes which pass students and promote individuals beyond their current merits, thus discrediting blacks generally.<sup>[46]</sup> In *The Bell Curve* he claims that general intelligence or g is something real and measurable; that US society is increasingly meritocratic in that people's position in society is now closely aligned with their intelligence; that black people are on average less intelligent than whites; and that affirmative action frequently takes particular groups of blacks beyond their abilities in dangerous and discrediting ways. Apart from the pleasure of seeing someone dare to engage in so much political incorrectness in so many directions at once, Murray's obvious concern not to be thought simplistically racist, or simply hostile to welfare makes him someone worth attending to and criticising. Equally, however, there is the problem that Murray makes three common-sense assumptions about human nature: of rational calculation, chiefly in *Losing Ground*; of the idea of a dependency culture, as found in his British writings on the underclass; and of crime being linked to stupidity in *The Bell Curve*.<sup>[47]</sup> Then in *In Pursuit of Happiness and Good Government* we find Aristotelian ideas about happiness followed by the use of Maslow's hierarchy of needs analysed as preconditions of happiness, combined with explicitly classical liberal ideas about the role of the state.<sup>[48]</sup> It is difficult to make these compatible.<sup>[49]</sup>

Thus although the lumpenproletariat/underclass should be seen as invalid as a substantive concept, there are plenty of issues surrounding it which need attention. For socialists these include the following. Do people who have developed some lumpen characteristics simply get back to work when offered decent opportunities? If not, what should be done about it? How much does it matter if some unskilled people choose to live on welfare benefits rather than do boring jobs? Is it genuinely true that the services of some less skilled and less able people are becoming superfluous in capitalist society?

*What should socialists aim to do about this? Particularly if it is because unskilled manufacturing jobs have shifted to third world countries which this work is helping to develop?*

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## **ENDNOTES**

[1] *For the best scholarly account of the lumpenproletariat in Marx see Hal Draper, 'The Concept of the Lumpenproletariat in Marx and Engels', Economies et Sociétés, Vol. 6, No. 12 (December 1972), pp. 2285--312.*

[2] *C.W., Vol. 6, p. 494.*

[3] *Karl Marx, Class Struggle in France, C.W., Vol. 10, p. 62.*

[4] *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, this volume, pp. 77-8.*

[5] *See Robert L. Bussard, 'The "Dangerous Class" of Marx and Engels: the Rise of the Idea of the lumpenproletariat', History of European Ideas, Vol. 8, No. 6 (1987), pp. 675--92, pp. 678--9. Stallybrass points out that Marx's exotic lists are similar to those compiled by journalists at the time--see Peter Stallybrass, 'Marx and Heterogeneity: Thinking the Lumpenproletariat', Representations, Iss. 31 (Summer 1990), pp. 69--95, p. 72. For the link to generally used ideas, see Huard on the distinction between le peuple and la populace, the latter corresponding to the lumpenproletariat: Raymond Huard, 'Marx et Engels devant la marginalité: la découverte du lumpenproletariat', Romantisme, Vol. 18, No. 59 (1988), pp. 4--17, p. 4.*

[6] *For a series of references to work which shows the Mobile Guard actually comprised proletarians see Frank Bovenkerk, 'The Rehabilitation of the Rabble: How and why Marx and Engels wrongly depicted the Lumpenproletariat as a Reactionary Force', The Netherlands Journal of Sociology, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1984), pp. 13--41, and Peter Hayes, 'Utopia and the Lumpenproletariat: Marx's Reasoning in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte', Review of Politics, Vol. 50, No. 3 (1988), pp. 445--65, p. 462-3, n. 13. Huard points out Marx's own verbal ambiguity here, suggesting he was aware this move does not entirely work ('Marx et Engels devant la marginalité', p. 10.)*

[7] *Cf. Bussard, 'The "Dangerous Class" of Marx and Engels', p. 687.*

[8] *Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850, C.W., Vol. 10, p. 51.*

[9] *Hayes interprets this in terms of the dialectic of history, 'Utopia and the Lumpenproletariat', p. 452.*

[10] Hayes, 'Utopia and the Lumpenproletariat', p. 447; cf. Hayes on Marx and crowds, p. 460.

[11] Bovenkerk, 'The Rehabilitation', p. 37.

[12] E. g. pp. 120-1.

[13] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Ch. XXV, in C.W., Vol. 35, pp. 637-9.

[14] *Ibid.*, Ch. XIV, Sect. 3, pp. 347--55; Ch. XV, Sect. 4, pp. 420-30.

[15] And, indeed, Huard suggests on the basis of one brief comment that Marx came to accept this--Huard, 'Marx et Engels devant la marginalité', p. 13.

[16] Bovenkerk, 'The Rehabilitation', p. 34.

[17] Mao says these elements, including Triads, can become revolutionary given proper leadership: Mao Tse Tung, 'Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society', *Selected Works* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), Vol. 1, p. 19.

[18] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), pp.102--3.

[19] For a careful survey of the cases where Marx and Engels attribute a political role to the lumpenproletariat, with the conclusion that they were invariably wrong about its reactionary role, see Bovenkerk, 'The Rehabilitation', pp. 22--34.

[20] Charles Murray, *Charles Murray and the Underclass: the developing debate* (London: IEA Health and Welfare Unit in association with the Sunday Times, 1996), p. 22

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 111.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 35. See also Charles Murray, *Underclass + 10* (London: Civitas, 2001), p. 6.

[26] Murray, *Underclass*, p. 43. For further reflections in this vein see Charles Murray et al., *Does Prison Work?* (London: IEA Health and Welfare Unit, 1997).

[27] More specifically: 'on the right (though more libertarian than conservative)'. See Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, *The Bell Curve* (New York: Free Press, 1996), p. 555.

[28] Murray, *Underclass*, p. 127.

[29] See, for example, Ken Roberts, 'Is there an emerging British "underclass"?' in Robert MacDonald (ed.), *Youth, the 'Underclass' and Social Exclusion* (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 39-54.

[30] Obviously Thatcher's New Right policies were generally paralleled by those of Reagan in the USA. For an analysis of the resulting growth in inequality see: Norman Fainstein, 'A Note on Interpreting American Poverty' in Enzo Mingione (ed.), *Urban Poverty and the Underclass* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 152-9.

[31] Les Johnston et al., *Snakes and Ladders: Young people, transitions and social exclusion* (Bristol: The Policy Press/Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2000), p. 1.

[32] For a summary of the cuts in welfare provisions affecting young people at this time, see Hartley Dean, 'Young People and Social Citizenship' in MacDonald, *Youth, the 'Underclass'*, pp. 55-69, pp. 59-60.

[33] Johnston et al., *Snakes and Ladders*, p. 1.

[34] The most trenchant being the wonderfully titled P. Bagguley and K. Mann, 'Idle thieving bastards? Scholarly representations of the "underclass"', *Work, Employment and Society*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1992), pp. 113-26.

[35] Melanie Phillips in Murray, *Underclass*, pp. 156 et seq. Buck points out that from 1979 to 1986 the number of inactive couple households grew by 350 per cent, far outstripping the rise in inactive single parent households--see Nick Buck, 'Labour market inactivity and polarisation' in David J. Smith (ed.), *Understanding the Underclass*, (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1992), pp. 9-31, esp. p. 16.

[36] Alan Walker in Murray, *Underclass*, p. 68.

[37] For example, Oscar Lewis, *La Vida* (New York: Random House, 1966).

[38] Johnston, *Snakes and Ladders*, p. 26, cf. Hartley Dean, 'Young People and Social Citizenship', p. 58, Gill Jones in MacDonald, *Youth, the 'Underclass'*, p. 112, Anthony Heath, 'The Attitudes of the Underclass', in Smith (ed.), *Understanding the Underclass*, pp. 32-47--see pp. 35-6.

[39] Loc. cit., cf. Rob MacDonald, 'Fiddly Jobs, Undeclared Working and the Something for Nothing Society', *Work Employment and Society*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 507--30.

[40] Johnston et al., *Snakes and Ladders*, p. 29.

[41] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 9.

[42] Indeed, one British response to Murray has been to define the underclass as the 'socially excluded', thus including, for example, poor pensioners and the disabled in it (see, for example, Field in Murray, *Underclass*, Debbie Baldwin et al., 'The formation of an underclass or disparate processes of social exclusion' in MacDonald, *Youth, the Underclass*, pp. 83-95). This is plainly not Murray's intent. For the idea of a link between US liberalism and the idea of an underclass on the one hand and European collectivism and the concept of social exclusion on the other, see Hilary Silver, 'National Discourses of the New Urban Poverty' in Mingione, *Urban Poverty*, pp. 105-38.

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 27-8.

[44] See, for example, Loic J. D. Wacquant and William Julius Wilson, 'The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion in the Inner City', pp. 25-42 of William Julius Wilson (ed.), *The Ghetto Underclass* (Newbury Park, CA.: Sage, 1993). Their description of what happened to the Black Belt in Chicago bears a striking resemblance to what happened in Middlesbrough, although against a background of less state intervention--see *ibid.*, p. 30. For a more general account of the collapse of unskilled employment in US inner cities, see John D. Kasarda, 'Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass' in Wilson (ed.), *The Ghetto Underclass*, pp. 43--64. For Murray's claim that black youth idleness has grown despite a booming economy, see: Charles Murray, 'The Underclass Revisited', at:

[45] Murray, 'The Underclass Revisited'.

[46] Charles Murray, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

[47] Herrnstein and Murray, *The Bell Curve*, Ch. 11.

[48] Charles Murray, *In Pursuit of Happiness and Good Government* (San Francisco, CA: ICS Press, 1994).

[49] See, for example, the brief critique by Jock Young in Murray, *Does Prison Work?*, pp. 31-2.